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The Illusory Enforcement of First Amendment Freedom:
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith and the Abandonment of the Compelling
Governmental Interest Test
The first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits govern-
mental interference with the free exercise of religion: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... . 1  The right to free exercise of religion is fundamental, but not
without limitation. Although the government cannot make laws that prohibit or
infringe on religious belief, it can, within limits, make laws that regulate general
conduct, even if that conduct springs from religious belief.2 The traditional test
for determining the constitutionality of a governmental regulation limiting a
fundamental right is whether the government can show an interest sufficiently
compelling to justify an infringement on the right.3 For example, courts often
hold that a state's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens is a
compelling state interest that justifies infringement on free exercise rights. Sev-
eral state and federal circuit courts have weighed this state interest against the
interest of certain religious groups in the sacramental use of illegal drugs.4 The
United States Supreme Court recently faced this issue in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.5
The Smith Court, however, avoided having to balance the individual's right
to religious freedom against the state's compelling interest, holding that the
compelling state interest test6 should no longer be used to determine whether a
law of general applicability 7 violates the United States Constitution. The
Supreme Court held that religious conduct in violation of a criminal regulation
1. U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
2. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
3. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
4. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77-78
(1964) (right to sacramental use of peyote by Native Americans outweighs state interest in protecting
Native American community from the deleterious effects of drugs and in drug enforcement); Olsen
v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct 1926
(1990) (state interest outweighs right to continual use of marijuana by members of the Ethiopian
Zion Coptic Church); Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415, 418
(9th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1115 (1973) (use of peyote by members of the Church of the
Awakening outweighs state interest in protecting the health of Native Americans).
5. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
6. The Supreme Court early applied the compelling state interest test, in form if not in name,
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, members of the Mormon Church
were indicted for bigamy under a Utah statute (Utah was a territory at that time). The Mormon
Church, however, required its male members to practice polygamy. The Court held that the state's
interest in protecting the institution of marriage was greater than the religious infringement on
Mormons who practiced polygamy.
7. A law of general applicability is a law that is directed towards all citizens of a state, as
opposed to a law specifically directed at a narrower group of citizens. For example, the statute in
Smith that prohibited the use of peyote by the general citizenry is a law of general application. In
contrast, a law that bans certain activity (I/., participating in the sacramental use of bread and wine)
only when engaged in for religious reasons or because of the religious beliefs it displays is directed at
a narrow group of citizens, and is thus unconstitutional. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
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of general applicability is not protected by the first amendment. In doing so, the
Court abandoned a mechanism that effectively protected religious freedom from
unjustified interference by the government. Further, the Court replaced this
mechanism with an inadequate test that leaves religious conduct vulnerable to
state law-making bodies.
This Note examines the precedent that has developed and that successfully
applied the compelling state interest test. It then analyzes the Smith decision
and the majority's reasons for rejecting the test. The Note asserts that the Court
in Smith had no sound basis for rejecting the compelling state interest test. The
Note concludes by reviewing potential ramifications the decision may have on
religious freedom.
Respondents in Smith, members of the Native American Church, worked
as counselors for ADAPT, a chemical dependency service. As a condition of
employment, ADAPT prohibited the use of drugs and alcohol by its employees
and reserved the right to terminate any employee who violated the ban. At a
Native American religious ceremony, respondents ingested a small amount of
peyote, a hallucinogenic drug.8 ADAPT discharged respondents because of this
episode.9 The Oregon Department of Human Resources denied respondents'
applications for unemployment compensation because their discharges were
based on work-related "misconduct." °10 At a state hearing that Smith requested,
the referee found that the state's interest in upholding the integrity of the unem-
ployment compensation fund was not compelling enough to justify interference
with respondents' right to the free exercise of religion and that respondents were
entitled to unemployment benefits.11 The Oregon Employment Appeals Board
8. For a description of the Native American religious ceremony and the use of peyote, see
infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
9. ADAPT set forth its policy concerning drugs and alcohol use in a memorandum issued
December 5, 1983. The memorandum provided: "Use of an illegal drug or use of prescription drugs
in a non-prescribed manner is grounds for immediate termination from employment." Smith v.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 211-12, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (1986),
vacated, 485 U.S. 660, on remand, 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
The ADAPT policy, however, was not at issue before the United States Supreme Court. The
Oregon Supreme Court stated that "an employer may impose conditions on employment that con-
flict with the employee's particular religious practices or beliefs." Id. at 215-16, 721 P.2d at 448.
10. Oregon Revised Statutes § 657.176(2)(a) provides: "An individual shall be disqualified from
the receipt of benefits ... if the authorized representative.., finds that the individual: (a) Has been
discharged with misconduct connected with work." OR. REv. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a) (1989).
Oregon Administrative Rule 471-30-038(3) defines misconduct as "a wilful violation of the stan-
dards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employee." OR. ADMIN. R. 471-
30-038(3) (1987).
11. Smith, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446. "[T]here is no evidence in the hearing record to
indicate that granting benefits to claimants whose unemployment is caused by adherence to religious
beliefs would have any significant impact on the trust fund." Id.
The United States Supreme Court issued one opinion covering two cases that were decided
separately in the Oregon courts. One respondent was Alfred Smith, a Native American. The other
was Galen Black, who, although not Native American, was a member of the Native American
Church. The lower court opinions and the referee's decisions referred to in this Note are mainly
decisions involving Alfred Smith, but the reasoning on the first amendment issue in both cases is
almost identical. In his recommendation concerning Galen Black, the referee found that Black's
ingestion of peyote was an "isolated instance of poor judgment" and not misconduct sufficient to
deny him unemployment compensation. Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources,
301 Or. 221, 223, 721 P.2d 451, 452 (1986).
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reversed, finding, that the state had a compelling interest "in the proscription of
illegal drugs" in addition to avoiding the burden on the state Unemployment
Compensation Fund.12 The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the Board deci-
sion. 13 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. 14 The court
held that although the denial of unemployment compensation to respondents did
not violate the Oregon Constitution,1 5 it did violate the federal constitution as a
constraint on the free exercise of religion.16
In ruling for respondents, the Oregon Supreme Court applied "a balancing
test that protects religiously motivated actions as well as religious beliefs." '17
The court found that the state's interest-the financial stability of the unemploy-
ment compensation fund-was not compelling enough to justify the "significant
burden on Smith's religious freedom" that resulted from the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits.1 s The court rejected the court of appeals' assertion that the
state's interest was the proscription of drug use.
Mhe legality of ingesting peyote does not affect our analysis of the
state's interest.... The Employment Division concedes that "the com-
mission of an illegal act is not, in and of itself, grounds for disqualifica-
tion from unemployment benefits. [Oregon Revised Statutes section]
657.176(3) permits disqualification only if a claimant commits a felony
in connection with work.... [Tihe legality of [claimant's] ingestion of
peyote has little direct bearing on this case. 19
The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, 20 held that the Oregon law
prohibiting use of illegal drugs2 1 was relevant. The Court reasoned that if the
state law, which effectively prohibited religious conduct, was constitutional, then
the State legally could deny unemployment compensation to those discharged
for engaging in that conduct.22 The Court remanded the case to the Oregon
Supreme Court to determine the legality of peyote use in Oregon. 23 On remand,
12. Smith, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446. In Black, the Board disagreed with the referee's
opinion and saw Black's use of peyote as misconduct. See Black, 301 Or. at 223, 721 P.2d at 452;
supra note 11.
13. 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985), rev'd, 300 Or. 562, 715 P.2d 93, modified, 301 Or.
209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986). vacated, 485 U.S. 660, on remand, 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
14. Smith, 301 Or. at 216, 721 P.2d at 448-49.
15. Id. The court found that the unemployment statute, Oregon Revised Statute
§ 657.176(2)(a) (1989), was neutral and therefore not violative of the Oregon Constitution. "The law
[OR. REv. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a)] and the rule defining misconduct [OR. ADMIN. R. § 471-30-
838(3)] in no way discriminate against claimant's religious practices or beliefs. If claimant's freedom
of worship has been interfered with, that interference was committed by his employer, not by the
unemployment statutes." Smith, 301 Or. at 216, 721 P.2d at 448.
16. Smith, 301 Or. at 217, 721 P.2d at 449.
17. Id. at 217, 721 P.2d at 449.
18. Id. at 218, 721 P.2d at 450.
19. Id.
20. Employment Div., Dept of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, on remand, 307 Or.
68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595, on remand, 310 Or. 376, 799 P.2d 148 (1990).
21. OR. REv. STAT. § 475.922(4)(a) (1987).
22. Smith, 485 U.S. at 670.
23. Id. at 673-74. The determination of the legality of peyote use in Oregon was significant to
the Court in fight of earlier cases in which the Court had held that the denial of unemployment
benefits to persons who were discharged for reasons related to their religious conduct violated the
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the Oregon Supreme Court found that use and possession of peyote was illegal
under Oregon law, which made no exception for religious use by Native Ameri-
cans. The Oregon court, however, reaffirmed its prior decision that the "First
Amendment prevents enforcement of prohibitions against possession or use of
peyote for religious purposes in the Native American Church .... "24 The
United States Supreme Court, again granting certiorari, 25 reversed the Oregon
Supreme Court, holding that the denial of unemployment compensation did not
violate respondents' first amendment rights to the free exercise of religion.
26
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, discarded the traditional "compelling
state interest test." He instead asserted that the free exercise clause provides no
protection to members of a religious group who violate a law of general applica-
bility--one not specifically aimed at certain religious practices-that is constitu-
tionally valid when applied to those who violate the law for nonreligious
purposes.27 Justice Scalia's new standard does not require the state to prove a
compelling interest to justify the infringement on an individual's first amend-
ment right. The issue before the Court was whether the Oregon statute prohibit-
ing peyote use, even for religious reasons, was constitutional under the free
exercise clause. Justice Scalia reasoned that if a state has the power to criminal-
ize religious conduct, then that state also has the power to deny unemployment
compensation for such conduct. Thus, if Oregon law prohibited the use of pe-
yote, which it did, and the prohibition is consistent with the federal constitution,
then there is no constitutional right to use peyote in Oregon, and the state is free
to withhold unemployment compensation for such misconduct, despite any reli-
gious motivation for that conduct.28 In his analysis of the right to free exercise
of religion, Justice Scalia limited the absolute protection afforded by the clause
to religious beliefs and declarations of those beliefs.29 While recognizing that
the exercise of religion often involves conduct, Justice Scalia rejected the propo-
sition that religious conduct is absolutely protected by the free exercise clause.3
0
Instead, he asserted that the Supreme Court has "never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohib-
iting conduct that the state is free to regulate."131 Justice Scalia differentiated
first amendment. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), discussed infra at notes 78-89;
Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), discussed infra at note
102 and accompanying text; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), dis-
cussed infra at note 103 and accompanying text. In these cases, the employees' conduct was per-
fectly legal. Thus, the Smith Court reasoned that the legality of the conduct engaged in is
determinative of whether that conduct merits constitutional protection. Smith, 485 U.S. at 674.
24. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 307 Or. 68, 76, 763 P.2d 146, 150
(1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
25. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
26. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opin-
ion, with Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun joining in Parts I and II. Justice Blackmun
dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1595.
27. Id. at 1599.
28. Id. at 1598-99.
29. Id. at 1599 ("[Firee exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1600 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Social Security laws); Gillette
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laws that ban only conduct engaged in for religious purposes and laws that pro-
hibit conduct generally and only incidentally infringe on free exercise.32 The
former violate the constitution; the latter do not. Justice Scalia added that the
only cases in which the Court has held that the first amendment forbids the
application of a neutral law of general applicability to religious conduct involved
"hybrid" situations, cases involving "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press."'33 Because the Oregon law prohibiting peyote use was a law of general
application and because the case did not entail a constitutional issue in addition
to freedom of religion, the first amendment did not bar Oregon from prohibiting
the religiously motivated use of peyote by respondents. 34
Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's judgment, with Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun joining her in part.35 Justice O'Connor agreed
with the majority's result, but challenged the majority's rejection of the compel-
ling state interest test.36 She asserted that the majority could have reached the
same conclusion by applying the compelling state interest test. In Justice
O'Connor's view, Oregon's interest in enforcing its drug laws and preventing
physical harm to its citizens is compelling enough to justify infringement on
respondents' first amendment rights.37
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Jus-
tice Blackmun, like Justice O'Connor, would have retained the compelling state
interest test. He asserted that a statute infringing on religious conduct is valid
only if the state can demonstrate a compelling interest and also can prove that
providing an exemption for the religious conduct seriously would hinder the
state's interest. 38 Justice Blackmun's application of the test, however, yields a
result contrary to that of Justice O'Connor. Justice Blackmun found that the
Native American Church's religious use of peyote was sufficiently controlled to
allow accommodation of the practice without seriously harming the state's inter-
est.39 Unlike the majority, Justice Blackmun did not characterize broad applica-
tion of the free exercise right as a "luxury,"' 4 but rather called it an "essential
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (selective service laws); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961) (Sunday closing laws); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor laws); Mi-
nersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (flag salute); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (polygamy laws)). All these cases support the proposition that religious
conduct is not free.
32. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600. If interference with a first amendment right "is not the object of
the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the
First Amendment has not been offended." Id.
33. Id. at 1601.
34. Id.
35. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun did not concur in the judgment.
36. Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, today's holding dramatically departs
from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the question
presented, and is incompatible with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious
liberty.").
37. Id. at 1613-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 1615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1618-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. The Court stated:
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element of liberty."'41
The central issue in the Smith decision is the validity of the compelling state
interest test as applied to free exercise claims. The test, as it has developed
through precedent, is divisible into three parts: 1) whether the law infringes on
an individual's first amendment rights; 2) whether the state can demonstrate a
compelling interest to justify the infringement; and 3) whether the religious con-
duct that violates the state's law can be accommodated without seriously harm-
ing the state's interest. At the first stage, courts may emphasize the
Constitution's preferred treatment of the first amendment right to free exercise
of religion and the framers' intent that the Free Exercise Clause protect minority
religions from persecution.42 The second part of the test recognizes that this
protection is qualified.43 The state can prohibit religious conduct that poses a
"substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." 44 If the religious conduct is
not of this type, however, and the court determines that the state's regulation
has infringed on the individual's free exercise right, the state must have a com-
pelling interest to justify the infringement. 45 The burden of proing a compel-
ling state interest is on the state.46 To demonstrate a "compelling" interest, the
state must meet a very exacting standard: "'[only] the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "47 If the
state meets its burden, the court may move to the third stage of the compelling
[P]recisely because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every con-
ceivable religious preference, and precisely because we value and protect that religious di-
vergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, . . . every
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
Id. at 1605 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The distorted view of our precedents leads the majority to conclude that strict scrutiny of a
state law burdening the free exercise of religion is a "luxury" that a well-ordered society
cannot afford, and the repression of minority religions is an "unavoidable consequence of
democratic society." I do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom
from religious persecution a "luxury".. . and they could not have thought religious intol-
erance "unavoidable," for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that
intolerance.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("As the language of the Clause itself makes
clear, an individual's free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional activity."); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878) (historical background on the first amendment and the
framers' intent).
43. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); see infra notes 53-67 and accompanying
text.
44. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
45. Id.
46. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972). This would seem to lend support to
Justice O'Connor's argument that sincere religious conduct should be "presumptively protected by
the Free Exercise Clause." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is arguable that
because the burden of proof is on the state, the state is actually "rebutting the presumption" that
religiously motivated conduct is protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
47. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)); see also
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (" 'Freedoms
of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on... slender grounds.
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect.'" (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
639 (1943))).
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state interest test and ask whether the state can accommodate the conduct of the
religious group without unduly interfering with the achievement of the state's
goal.4 8 To answer this question, the court must narrow the scope of the state's
interest properly.
The compelling state interest test grew out of the Court's recognition that,
while the right to free exercise of religion is essential and is worthy of protection
from infringement, the state has the power to regulate the conduct of its citizens.
In Reynolds v. United States,4 9 the Court weighed the right of Mormons to prac-
tice polygamy against the state's interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage.50
The Court upheld the prohibition of polygamy because of the practice's grave
implications on state interests.5 1 Reynolds involved a statute of general applica-
bility that prohibited conduct mandated by the Mormon faith. The Court, how-
ever, found the prohibition was justified, not because it was a generally
applicable law, but because polygamy seriously would injure the state's interest
in family and marriage. 52
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,5 3 the Court applied the compelling state interest
test to hold unconstitutional another statute that infringed on first amendment
rights. In Cantwell, petitioner, a Jehovah's witness, was convicted of breaching
the peace, a common-law offense, and violating a Connecticut statute prohibit-
ing solicitation without certification from the secretary of the state public wel-
fare council.5 4 The Supreme Court reversed petitioner's conviction, holding that
the conviction for a common-law offense violated petitioner's constitutional
rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of speech.55 The Court also held
that the Connecticut statute violated petitioner's religious and free speech rights
because the right to solicit aid for religious causes depended on the secretary's
prior determination that the cause was a valid religious one. The Court found
that such prior restraint on the right to exercise freely one's religion places "a
48. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1614 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[m'he critical question in this
case is whether exempting respondents from the State's general criminal prohibition 'will unduly
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.' "(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
259 (1982))); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means
of achieving some compelling state interest); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222 (education of children at home
does not interfere with state's goal of intelligent, responsible citizenry).
49. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
50. Id. at 165-66. "Marriage... is... a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it
society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and
duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal." Id. at 165.
51. Id. at 166-68.
52. The Court's analysis took the form commonly seen in later cases. First the Court examined
whether the state law infringed on Reynolds' right to exercise his religion freely. Id. at 162. After
finding that the statute did infringe on his free exercise right, the Court determined whether the state
had a compelling interest that could justify the infringement. Id. at 165-66. Finally, the Court
determined that an exception from the statute for the religious conduct of the individuals would
interfere with satisfying of the state's interest. Id. at 166.
53. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
54. Id. at 301-02. Petitioner distributed religious pamphlets and played records in public that
contained remarks offensive to certain religions. Two men who stopped to listen to the record were
"incensed" by it and "were tempted to strike [petitioner] unless he went away." Id. at 303.
55. Id. at 307-11.
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forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution. '56
In an often-quoted passage, the Court described a state's power to regulate reli-
gious conduct under the first amendment: "fT]he Amendment embraces two
concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but...
the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection
of society."' 57 The Court stated that "[i]n every case the power to regulate must
be exercised as not.., unduly to infringe the protected freedom." 58
Although the Connecticut statute was "general and nondiscriminatory leg-
islation,"'5 9 the Court found that the state's interest in "public safety, peace,
comfort or convenience" and in "protect[ing] its citizens from fraudulent solici-
tation" 6 did not justify preconditioning first amendment rights on an official
examination of the validity of a religious cause. 61
The Court's decision in Cantwell is important for several reasons. It estab-
lished that the first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.62 It also held that while the government can regulate religious con-
duct "for the protection of society," it cannot "unduly... infringe" upon pro-
tected freedoms.63 The Court recognized that, although individuals might abuse
their first amendment rights, "the people of this nation have ordained ... that,
in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of citizens of
a democracy."" The Court further acknowledged that freedom of religion is
especially necessary "in our own country for a people composed of many races
and many creeds." 65 Most importantly, the Court's decision gave some defini-
tion to the permissible limits of religious conduct; the state may "appropriately
... punish... coercive activity of those who in the delusion of racial or religious
conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive
others of their equal right to exercise of their liberties."'66 Finally, the Court
applied a test that balanced the state's interest in protecting its citizens against
the individual's right to free exercise of religious conduct, even though a neutral
56. Id. at 303-07.
57. Id. at 303-04.
58. Id. at 304.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 306-07.
61. Id. at 307. Regarding the breach of peace charge, the Court found that petitioner's conduct
did not amount to a breach of peace. Id. at 309-10. The Court also mentioned that there was no
narrow and defined statute regulating the offense. If there had been, it "would weigh heavily in any
challenge of the law as infringing constitutional limitations." Id. at 308. The state has power "to
prevent or punish" in the face of "clear and present danger of... immediate threat to public safety,
peace or order." Id.
62. Id. at 304.
63. Id. at 304.
64. Id. at 310. Thus, the idea that free exercise of religion is necessary to the vitality of a
democracy is contrary to Justice Scalia's statement that infringement of free exercise is an "unavoid-
able consequence of democratic government." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
65. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310. This also tends to discredit Justice Scalia's assertion that the
diversity of religious beliefs warrants greater restriction on the free exercise of religion.
66. Id.
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statute of general applicability regulated the conduct involved. 67
As the compelling state interest test developed, the Court also considered
whether the state could accommodate specific religious conduct without harm-
ing its interest. In United States v. Lee,68 the Supreme Court applied the com-
pelling state interest test to a challenge by an Amish employer against a Social
Security law requiring employers to pay Social Security taxes for their employ-
ees. The employer asserted that the law requiring him to pay Social Security
taxes violated his first amendment rights because the Amish faith holds that it is
sinful not to take care of one's own elderly. After finding that the Social Secur-
ity law interfered with the free exercise of the Amish religion, the Court next
determined that the state had a compelling interest in the welfare of the elderly
that justified the infringement. 69 Finally, the Court considered whether creating
an exemption for the Amish belief would so interfere with the attainment of the
state's interest as to "radically restrict" the power of the legislature to enact laws
furthering the state's purpose. 70 The Court found that it would be too difficult
to accommodate the Social Security system to every individual who claimed the
law infringed upon his religious beliefs.71 Thus, the Court held that the public
interest in maintaining a sound tax system outweighed the infringement on the
employer's exercise of religion, considering that the employer chose to enter
commerce initially.72
The Court reached the "high-water mark" in its free exercise jurisprudence
in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder.73 Yoder involved a neutral compulsory
school attendance law of general applicability, yet the Court held that the consti-
tutional rights of the Amish prevailed over the state's interest. The Court rea-
soned that the Amish religion and way of life were accommodated easily
without interfering with the State's interest in compulsory school attendance. 74
The Amish believed that sending their children to high school would expose
them to secular and worldly ideas rejected by the Amish faith.75 They offered
67. Id. at 307.
68. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
69. Id. at 258-59.
70. Id. at 259 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
71. Id. at 260.
72. Id.
73. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
74. Id. at 235-36. The Court also strongly emphasized that the Amish religion is an established
one, having existed in this country for almost 200 years. Id. at 227, 229, 235. It is not "a way of life
and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more
enlightened process for rearing children for modem life." Id. at 235. The Court also noted that the
compulsory school attendance law is relatively recent (less than 60 years old) compared to the exist-
ence of the Amish religion. Id. at 226.
75. Id. at 218.
The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to
worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by sub-
stantially interfering with the religious development of the Amish child and his integration
into the way of life of the Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of devel-
opment, contravenes the basic religious tenants and practice of the Amish faith, both as to
the parent and the child.
Id.
The Amish object to high school because "the values [high schools] teach are in marked varil-
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proof that their children received an adequate education at home while the chil-
dren worked and were intelligent, productive members of society. The Court
identified a valid state interest in protecting children from ignorance and child
labor, and in ensuring that they become productive members of society.76 It
held, however, that exempting the Amish from the statute would not harm the
state's interest and, similarly, that forcing the Amish to comply with the law
would not advance the state's interest. 77
The Court first applied the compelling state interest test to an unemploy-
ment compensation case in 1973 in Sherbert v. Verner.78 Sherbert is one of three
cases in which the Supreme Court held that the state's interest in the integrity of
its unemployment compensation fund does not justify an infringement of an in-
dividual's first amendment rights.79 Sherbert involved a mill worker who was
discharged because she refused to work on Saturday. Her religious group, the
Seventh Day Adventists, did not permit work on Saturday, the group's Sabbath.
The Employment Security Division found that appellant, without good cause,
did not accept "suitable work" offered to her by her employer, and thus it denied
her unemployment compensation.80 The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
government may regulate specifically conduct or actions that pose "some sub-
stantial threat to public safety, peace, or order."8 ' Because appellant's conscien-
ance with ... the Amish way of life; they view secondary school education as an impermissible
exposure of their children to a 'worldly' influence in conflict with their beliefs." Id. at 210-11. Spe-
cifically, the Amish way of life teaches "informal learning-through-doing; a life of 'goodness' rather
than intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than competi-
tion," while a high school education emphasizes "intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-
distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students." Id. at 211.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 222. There are many other free exercise cases in which the Court applied a "compel-
ling interest" or similar test. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Court upheld Sunday
closing laws that infringed on Jewish petitioners' ability to exercise their religion by imposing "seri-
ous economic disadvantages on them if they adhered to the observance of the Sabbath." Id. at 602.
The Court found that the state's "preoccupation with improvingthe health, safety, morals and gen-
eral well-being of [its] citizens" justified any infringement on petitioners' ability to freely exercise
their religion. Id. at 603. In addition, the Court found that "to permit the exemption [of petitioners
from the Sunday closing laws] might well undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best
possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity." Id. at 608.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court held that the state's interest in
protecting children from abuse and in giving them the opportunity to grow "into free and independ-
ent well-developed men and citizens" justified a law forbidding a guardian to permit sales of periodi-
cals in public places by minors, even though the law infringed on the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses to
exercise their religion freely. Id. at 165; see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(substantial governmental interests relating to military conscription justify burden on conscientious
objectors); Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (government's interest
in unity and loyalty severed by compulsory flag salute law outweighs infringement on Jehovah's
Witness prohibition against idol worship).
78. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
79. The other two cases are Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480
U.S. 136 (1987). While these cases may seem particularly applicable to Smith, which also concerned
a denial of unemployment benefits, the Smith Court explicitly stated that proper analysis should
focus not on the Oregon Unemployment Compensation statute, but rather on the Oregon law
prohibiting use and possession of peyote. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598-99.
80. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-01.
81. Id. at 402. "[The Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to govern-
mental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles .... The conduct
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tious objection to Saturday work did not pose a substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order, however, the State was obliged to show either that appel-
lant's disqualification as a beneficiary did not infringe her rights to free exercise,
or that "any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be
justified 'by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate.' "82 Employing the compelling state
interest test, the Court first found that the unemployment compensation statute
placed a condition on the receipt of unemployment benefits, which discouraged
appellant's free exercise of religion by "forc[ing] her to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits... and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work."83 After finding that the statute
did infringe on appellant's constitutional rights, the Court moved to the second
stage of its analysis-whether the state had a compelling interest in enforcing its
statute that could justify the infringement.84 In this second stage analysis, the
Court asserted that "'only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest,
give occasion for permissible limitation.' "85 A showing of "merely ... a ra-
tional relationship to some colorable state interest" is not sufficient to justify an
infringement of religious conduct.86 The Court dismissed a State argument that
claimants could defraud the unemployment fund by feigning religious objections
to Saturday work.87 The Court noted that no evidence of fraud existed and that,
in any case, the State would have to demonstrate that no alternative means ex-
isted to stop such abuses before infringing on religious conduct. 88 The Court
concluded, after applying the test, that the state's interest did not outweigh the
infringement on appellant's first amendment rights.89
Recently, the Court signalled a move away from the compelling state inter-
est test in the free exercise context. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tection Association,90 the Court declined to apply the test, finding that the
governmental action did not even infringe on the first amendment right. Lyng
involved a free exercise challenge to a government project to construct a road
through a national forest, near an area that several Native American tribes used
or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or or-
der." Id. at 403 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878)); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) ("No one would have the
hardihood to suggest that... religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical
attack .... When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace or order, appears, the power of the state to
prevent or punish is obvious.")
82. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
83. Id. at 404. The Court observed that "such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Id.
84. Id. at 406.
85. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 407.
88. Id. The Court referred to Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), in which the Court
held that the state's interest in providing a uniform day of rest for all workers could be achieved only
by "declaring Sunday to be that day of rest." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408.
89. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
90. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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for religious rituals.91 The Native Americans claimed that a quiet, private, and
"undisturbed natural setting" was crucial to the performance of these rituals. 92
Construction of the road therefore would interfere with the Native Americans'
ability to practice their religion. Nonetheless, the Court held that the "inciden-
tal effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice
certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs" do not violate the first amendment. 93 In this
instance, the state did not need to show a compelling interest for its action.94
"The crucial word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit': 'For the Free Exercise
Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual,
not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.' ,95
Although the Smith Court refused to apply the compelling state interest
test to respondents' free exercise claim, it did not dismiss the test for all pur-
poses. Apparently the test still applies in cases in which unemployment com-
pensation is denied because the claimant is unemployed as a result of religiously
motivated conduct. 96 According to the Court, the issue in this case is not the
validity of the unemployment compensation statute, but the validity of the Ore-
gon drug use statute, which does not provide an exemption for respondents'
religious use of peyote.97 In the eyes of the Court, Smith falls outside the unem-
ployment compensation context. 98 According to Justice Scalia, when the Court
in the past applied the test outside of the unemployment context, it always found
that the state demonstrated a compelling interest to justify the infringement. 99
91. Id. at 442-43.
92. Id. at 442.
93. Id. at 450.
94. Id. at 450-51.
95. Id. at 451 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
Justice O'Connor found it material that affording the Native Americans the privacy they sought
"could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public prop-
erty." Id. at 453. The rights of the Native Americans to exercise their religion could not divest the
Government of its right to use its own land. Id. Justice O'Connor pointed out, however, that if the
Government prohibited the Native Americans access to the area, that restriction would constitute a
violation of the free exercise clause. Id.
See also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986) (Plaintiffs' claim that the assignment of a
Social Security number to their daughter would rob her of her spirit dismissed because the law did
not violate the free exercise clause. "The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from
certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the
conduct of the Government's internal procedures."); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 602 (1961)
(Sunday closing laws causing "serious economic disadvantage" to Sabbatarians do not prohibit ap-
pellants' free exercise of religion). The Court in Braunfeld, however, did go on to weigh the state's
interest in preserving a unified day of rest for its citizens. Id. at 607-09.
96. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598.
97. Id. at 1598-99.
98. Id.
99. Id.
Applying that test, we have, on three occasions, invalidated state unemployment compen-
sation rules that conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant's willingness to
work under conditions forbidden by his religion.... We have never invalidated any gov-
ernmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment com-
pensation.... In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test [outside
the unemployment compensation field] at all.
Id. at 1602 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Megre v. Larsen, 402 U.S. 934 (1971);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)).
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He also noted that the Court has started refusing to apply the test outside of the
unemployment compensation context. 10 According to Scalia, Smith differs
from the Court's prior unemployment cases, Sherbert v. Verner,10 1 Thomas v.
Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division,10 2 and Hobble v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Commission of Florida.103 Justice Scalia asserted that these
previous unemployment cases allowed for an individualized assessment of the
reasons for the misconduct, permitting a balancing against the state's interest,t 0 4
100. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-03; see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988) (analysis not applied to logging and construction activities of federal government
near land used by Native Americans for religious rituals, even though the government's activity
would render almost impossible the Native Americans' religious ceremonies); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (test not used in upholding prison's refusal to alter work schedules so
that prisoner could attend worship services); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (test not applied to
law requiring every citizen to have a social security number, even though plaintiffs believed that it
would violate their religious belief and hinder their daughter's spiritual growth); Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Sherbert test not applied to challenge of military dress codes that did
not allow the wearing of yarmulkes).
There are several rationales, however, for not applying the compelling state interest test in these
cases. In her concurring opinion in Smith, in which she objects to the Court's abandonment of the
test, Justice O'Connor refers to Roy and Lyng as cases dealing with the regulation of internal govern-
mental affairs (as opposed to external affairs such as criminal laws). Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1611-12
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor asserted that the "Free Exercise Clause is written in
terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can
exact from the government." Id. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 393, 412 (Douglas, J., concurring)). Therefore, while the government cannot prohibit or
interfere with an individual's free exercise of religion, an individual cannot require the government to
change the regulations of its own internal affairs to advance her religious beliefs. (le., the govern-
ment cannot act to prohibit an individual from attaining spiritual growth, but it does not have to act
in such a way as to foster that spiritual growth).
Justice Scalia in Smith rejected this argument by asserting that what Justice Douglas must have
meant in Sherbert is that "what 'the government cannot do to the individual' includes not just the
prohibition of an individual's freedom of action through criminal laws, but also the running of its
programs... in such fashion as to harm the individual's religious interests." Id. at 1603-04 n.2.
Justice Scalia also found it difficult to understand "why the government should have to tailor its
health and safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief, but should not have to tailor its
management of public lands, or its administration of welfare programs." Id. (citations omitted).
One commentator criticized Justice Scalia's approach. Referring to Goldman and O'Lone, this
commentator asserts that "[p]rison and the military... are not contexts pertinent to defining the
constitutional rights of citizens in a free society." R_ Neuhaus, Church, State and Peyote: Supreme
Court Ruling on Use of Peyote in Indian Religious Ceremonies, NAT'L REv., June 11, 1990, at 40, 42;
see also Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Goldman and O'Lone are "distinguish-
able because they arose in the narrow, specialized contexts in which we have not traditionally re-
quired the government to justify a burden on religious conduct by articulating a compelling
interest.").
101. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 78-89. In Sherbert, the Court held that the state's
interest in the integrity of its unemployment compensation fund did not justify the infringement on
the first amendment rights of a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired because she refused to work on
Saturday, in accordance with her religious beliefs. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
102. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, the Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits
to petitioner violated his first amendment right to free exercise of religion. Petitioner, a Jehovah's
Witness, was fired because he refused to work in a department that produced weapons, which he
claimed were against his religion. Id. at 719.
103. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). In Hobbie, the Court held that the state's refusal to grant appellant, a
Seventh Day Adventist, unemployment benefits violated the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. Id. at 139-46. Appellant was discharged because she refused to work on Friday evenings and
Saturdays, her religion's Sabbath. Id. at 138.
104. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603. The unemployment compensation laws, because they base the
allowance of compensation on the reason for the individual's dismissal, permit a case-by-case assess-
ment of the conduct, thus facilitating the balancing of the conduct against the state's interest.
"[W]rWhere the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
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and had "nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a par-
ticular form of conduct" as in Smith.10 5 Although the Court in the past applied
the test to challenges of laws other than unemployment compensation laws, 10 6
Justice Scalia concluded that "the sounder approach.., is to hold the test inap-
plicable to such challenges." 10 7
Justice Scalia asserted that to apply the compelling state interest test to all
laws would invite anarchy.10 8 He reasoned that if the "test is to be applied at
all, then it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be relig-
iously commanded.""1 9 Many laws could not meet the test and would be invali-
dated. 11 0 Justice Scala concluded by stating that legislatures are free to exempt
certain religious conduct from their criminal laws, but the federal constitution
does not require them to do so.111 While recognizing that abandoning the com-
pelling state interest test will have an adverse effect on minority religions, he
asserted that such is the price of democracy.1 12
system to cases of'religious hardship' without compelling reason." Id. (paraphrasing Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
105. Id. The respondents' situation in Smith differed from that of the claimants in the cited
cases. The conduct that caused respondents' dismissal from employment in Smith also violated a
state criminal law. In the other unemployment compensation cases, the claimants dismissal resulted
from either a personal decision or a refusal to comply with the requirements of the employer. See
e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (discussed supra note
103); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment See. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (discussed supra
note 102); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (discussed supra notes 78-89 and accompanying
text).
106. See supra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
107. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603. "The government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,
'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development."' Id. (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
451 (1988)). The government's prohibition of the use of peyote by Native Americans in their reli-
gious ceremonies, however, does not have just some effect "on a religious objector's spiritual devel-
opment" as it did in Lyng, but instead renders the legal use of peyote impossible in Oregon.
The Court also rejected the possibility of applying the test only to those situations in which a
law infringes on conduct central to the individual's religious beliefs. The role of the judiciary, the
Court asserted, does not include testing the sincerity or the importance of certain religious conduct.
Id. at 1604. "It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds." Id. (quot-
ing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)); see also United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that the veracity of a person's religious beliefs should not be submitted to
the jury).
108. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.
109. Id. This statement indicates that the test will not apply even to cases of denial of unemploy-
ment compensation because to apply it in that context would necessitate applying it "across-the-
board."
110. Id. Justice Scalia added that the "danger [of anarchy] increases in direct proportion to the
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them." Id.
Presumably, the danger would be the greatest in the United States because of the great diversity of
religious beliefs.
111. Id. at 1606.
112. Id. Justice Scalia stated:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that una-
voidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
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In Smith, Justice Scalia provided little, if any, justification for rejecting pre-
cedent and the application of the compelling state interest test. He construed
the first amendment so that neutral laws of general applicability do not fall
under its protection.1 13 He implied, however, that the right to free exercise of
religion, infringed on by laws directed at certain religious practices114 and by
unemployment compensation laws, is still protected under the first amendment
through the application of the compelling state interest test. There is nothing in
the wording of the first amendment to suggest such a distinction. The Constitu-
tion states that "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]." '115 To follow the mandates of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has held that a state must prove a compelling interest in the purpose of its law,
of general applicability or otherwise, to justify state infringement on an individ-
ual's first amendment rights. The justification for applying the test is to protect
from arbitrary state legislation religious freedom that is not harmful to the
state's interest. The first amendment was enacted "precisely to protect the rights
of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be
viewed with hostility." 116
Justice Scalia relies heavily on his interpretation of precedent, stating that
the Court has never held a law of general applicability unconstitutional in a case
involving only a free exercise claim. 117 Thus, Cantwell v. Connecticut,11  be-
cause it involved freedom of speech (the right to disseminate religious views in
public), and Wisconsin v. Yoder,119 because it involved parental rights (the rights
of Amish parents to educate their children at home), cannot apply to a case like
Smith, which contains only a free exercise claim. These "hybrid" cases suppos-
edly are more deserving of the application of the compelling state interest test
because they involve more than one first amendment right. In her concurrence
in Smith, however, Justice O'Connor points out that Cantwell and Yoder "ex-
pressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause." 120 In addition, these two cases ap-
plied the compelling state interest test: "[I]n each of the other cases cited by the
Court to support its categorical rule, we rejected the particular constitutional
claims before us only after carefully weighing the competing interests.",1 21 More
113. Id. at 1601-03.
114. Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
116. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. The majority opinion states:
[Tihe only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitu-
tional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.
Id. at 1601 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia went on to assert, "[Tihe present case does not present
such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or
parental right." Id. at 1602.
118. 310 U.s. 296 (1940). For a discussion of Cantwell, see supra notes 53-67 and accompanying
text.
119. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a discussion of Yoder, see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying
text.
120. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971);
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importantly, Justice Scalia's analysis does not lead to the conclusion that the
compelling state interest test should not be applied to nonhybrid cases. The
rationale for applying the test to "hybrid" cases-ensuring the protection of first
amendment rights against infringement by a lesser state interest-applies
equally well to cases like Smith, which involved only one constitutional claim.
That a case asserts a violation of only one first amendment right does not mean
that the constitutional right deserves any less protection and consideration by
the Court. The Court developed the compelling interest test to apply to any
state regulation that had the effect of infringing on first amendment freedoms.
The first amendment does not provide that when more than one constitutional
right is present in a case, each right merits more protection. Nor does the Con-
stitution imply that one constitutional right is so much more important than
another that it can "boost" the right to free exercise of religion to a status re-
quiring protections it would not have if presented alone. The assertion that the
only cases that have reached the Court worthy of protection by the free exercise
clause have involved other constitutional rights does not lead to the conclusion
that a claim involving only an infringement on free exercise is not entitled to the
same protection.
The rationale that abandoning the compelling state interest test is necessary
to protect the state's interest is also incorrect. The Court has applied the com-
pelling state interest test to "nonhybrid" cases and concluded that the state's
interest justified the infringement on the constitutional right. 12 2 This fact lends
support to the test's workability and usefulness.1 23 The test has worked effec-
tively to uphold state regulations at each of its stages. At the first stage, the
court may find that the regulation or law does not infringe on the free exercise of
religion at all. This was the case in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Association.1 24 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor, who wrote the Lyng opin-
ion, objects to the Court's refusal to apply the test in Smith.1 25 At the second
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70
(1944)). She further asserted that Cantwell and Yoder are regarded "as part of the mainstream of
our free exercise jurisprudence." Id. (O'Connor, J. concurring).
122. See supra note 77.
123. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the majority opinion, Justice
Scalia listed cases in which the Court has applied the compelling state interest test, id. at 1605-06;
Justice O'Connor refers to these cases as a "parade of horribles." Id. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia seems to be trying to show that in applying the Sherbert test the Court
has never invalidated "an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct,"
and that the test is somehow ineffective against this type of law and thus should not be applied to
analyze challenges against this type of law. Id. at 1603. This implication lacks merit. If the purpose
of the test is to balance the state's right to regulate conduct in violation of its laws against the right of
an individual to exercise his religion freely by requiring that the state's interest in regulating certain
conduct is great or compelling, the cases the Court refers to show that the test was effective in
upholding essential state laws. See, eg., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Social Security
laws); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (draft laws); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1879) (polygamy statute). Other cases such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unem-
ployment compensation statute), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school
attendance law), demonstrate that the test also is effective in protecting free exercise rights in cases in
which either the state interest is not paramount or the religious conduct can be accommodated
without interfering with the state's interest.
124. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
125. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1607, 1611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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stage of the test, courts can uphold a governmental regulation by showing that
the state has a compelling interest that justifies the infringement. This has been
the most common theory for the Court's validation of a state's statute.126 At the
third stage, a court can uphold a state's law after a finding that it does infringe
on an individual's right to free exercise of religion if accommodation of the reli-
gious conduct seriously would interfere with or unduly restrict the state's ability
to fulfill its interest. Thus, in United States v. Lee,' 27 the Court found that
"[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge
the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their
religious belief." 128
The majority's abandonment in Smith of the compelling state interest test
lacks justification, especially in light of the Court's previous recognition of the
need to balance the individual's right to religious freedom against the state's
interest, and considering the successful application of the compelling state inter-
est test to resolve this conflict. 129 The Court cannot argue that abandoning the
test was necessary to protect the state's interest in this case. Justice O'Connor
applied the test to the facts in Smith and came up with the same result as that of
the majority.13 0
There are several factors that could have led the Smith Court to abandon
the compelling state interest test. Four possible factors, discussed below, include
the Court's desire to enhance judicial economy, the slippery slope argument,
concerns that the compelling state interest test no longer worked, and the
Court's desire to aid the war on drugs.
First, the Court may have been concerned with judicial economy. A bright
line rule, like that of Smith, presumably is easier for courts to apply, and thus
would reduce the number of appeals on that issue. Under the new Smith stan-
dard, if the lower court determines that the law is neutral and of general applica-
bility, any resulting infringement on free exercise of religion is constitutional. 131
126. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982) (state's interest in welfare of the elderly);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (government interest in military conscription
justifies infringement); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (interest in safeguarding
children from abuse justifies law that affects ability of Jehovah's Witness children to hand out reli-
gious material); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940) (state interest in na-
tional unity and loyalty as served by compulsory flag salute outweighs infringement on free exercise
of Jehovah's witness); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (state's interest in uphold-
ing the integrity of marriage justifies infringement on Mormon practice of polygamy).
127. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
128. Id. at 260.
129. See supra note 77.
130. Justice O'Connor found that the Oregon law prohibiting peyote use infringed on the rights
of respondents because, as members of the Native American Church, they "must choose between
carrying out the ritual embodying their religious beliefs and avoidance of criminal prosecution . .. ."
She also found, however, that Oregon's interests in "enforcing laws that control the possession and
use of controlled substances by its citizens" and "preventing the physical harm caused by the use of a
schedule I controlled substance" were compelling enough to justify the infringement on respondents'
first amendment rights. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
concluded that exempting the Native American Church from the law prohibiting use of peyote
would "seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote by its citi-
zens." Id. at 1614 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 1600 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
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Alternatively, if the court finds that the law is designed to prohibit conduct by
members of a particular religion, then the law is unconstitutional. 132 Presuma-
bly, and this is a point the Court does not make clear, the Court must apply the
compelling state interest test only in cases in which the statute involved is an
unemployment compensation statute. This is so because "[t]he Sherbert test...
was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assess-
ment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.... [W]here the State has in place a
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases
of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason." 133
Cases argued in lower courts since Smith suggest that the new standard is
not so easily understood or readily accepted.134 Professor Choper suggests that
the Court's decision in Smith will not affect greatly the way it decides future free
exercise cases, but it will have a major effect on state courts. 135 His prediction
appears to be playing out in the lower courts. In a recent Minnesota case, the
Old Order Amish claimed that a Minnesota statute, requiring all slow moving
vehicles to display a fluorescent symbol when on public highways, violates the
free exercise clause.136 The Minnesota Supreme Court deliberately avoided the
application of the Smith standard and held that under its state constitution, state
laws of general applicability that infringe on religious beliefs or practices are
invalid, unless the state can prove that its compelling interest is not attainable
through any other means. 137
A concern related to the Court's desire for judicial economy is the "slippery
slope" argument. The Court states that "[i]f the 'compelling interest' test is to
be applied at all, then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought
to be religiously commanded." 138 Application of the test to all laws that vio-
lated religious beliefs, however, would invalidate many laws because they would
not meet the test. This, the Court fears, could result in anarchy, the danger of
concurring)). "Even if we were inclined to breathe... some life beyond the unemployment compen-
sation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law."
Id. at 1603.
132. See id. at 1599. "[A] state would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought to
ban such acts [as assembling with others for a worship service] or abstentions only when they are
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the belief that they display." Id.
133. Id. at 1603. The Court's opinion does not set forth a standard when a civil law of general
applicability is at issue. It is arguable that the Court considers criminal laws of general applicability
as inherently containing compelling state interests that justify infringement on first amendment
rights, because violations of criminal laws tend to have greater effects on the state's citizens. For a
different conclusion, see Constitutional Law Conference, 59 U.S.L.W. 2272, 2275 (Nov. 6, 1990).
Professor Jesse H. Choper argues that Justice Scalia's apparent limitation of the Smith holding to
criminal laws will not be a "serious limitation" because criminal laws generally command a higher
scrutiny than do civil regulations and "are often thought to make a stronger case for recognizing a
free exercise exemption." Id. The suggestion is that under the Smith holding, religious conduct in
violation of a civil regulation will not be afforded any more protection than will religious conduct in
violation of a criminal law.
134. See infra notes 163-64.
135. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 133, at 2275.
136. The Amish claim that their religion prohibits the display of loud colors and worldly sym-
bols. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
137. Id. at 396-97.
138. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.
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which "increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious be-
liefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them." 139 Thus, be-
cause the United States is diverse religiously, the danger of anarchy is great. 14°
The "slippery slope" argument, however, lacks support in practical experi-
ence. Courts have applied the test in free exercise cases to strike down laws, and
anarchy has not resulted. 141 To the contrary, the test has had the effect of up-
holding state laws when based on valid, compelling state interests. 142 Cases that
have pointed out the deleterious effects of making exceptions to laws for all reli-
gious denominations have done so not as a justification for not applying the test
at all, but as support for upholding a law in question.143
A third reason for Justice Scalia's rejection of the compelling state interest
test might be that he felt that the test had become watered down and largely
ineffective in deciding free exercise cases. 144 According to Professor Choper, it
was not until the Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut 145 in 1940 that the
Court applied the compelling state interest test to invalidate a law of general
applicability. Professor Choper asserts that after Cantwell and until Sherbert v.
Verner in 1963, almost every free exercise case was of the "hybrid" type and
could have been decided on free speech grounds. 146 After 1963, aside from
Sherbert, the cases affirming Sherbert, 147 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,148 the compel-
ling state interest test was not used to invalidate a neutral law of general applica-
bility. Thus, perhaps Justice Scalia felt he merely was laying to rest a test that
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 77.
142. See, eg., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (discussed supra notes 68-72 and accom-
panying text) (states' compelling interest in welfare of the elderly upheld social security law); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussed supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text) (struck
down law compelling school attendance); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (discussed
supra note 77) (upheld draft laws); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (discussed supra notes
78-89 and accompanying text) (struck down unemployment compensation law not allowing payment
to employees discharged for religious purposes).
143. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982) ("Unlike the situation presented in
Wisconsin v. Yoder .... it would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security
system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) ("[W]e are a cosmopolitan nation made up of almost every conceiv-
able religious preference .... Consequently, it cannot be expected, much less required, that the
legislature enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in economic disadvantage to
some religious sects ....")
The Court in Braunfeld, however, continued:
To hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct which imposes solely an indirect
burden on the observance of religion would be a gross oversimplification.... [I]f the State
regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power... the statute is valid despite
its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by
means which do not impose such a burden.
Id. at 607 (emphasis added). Thus, even in the face of a multitude of religious claims, the Court has
held that the compelling state interest test is necessary.
144. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 133, at 2274.
145. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
146. Constitutional Law Conference, supra note 133, at 2274.
147. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (discussed supra note 102); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (discussed supra note 103).
148. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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the Court never really applied anyway. Even if the Court has not used the test
to invalidate a law under the free exercise clause, however, the Court has at least
used the test. The test serves an important function in protecting the conduct of
minority religions from infringement by arbitrary state laws by balancing the
government's interests against the individual's religious interests. If Justice
Scalia felt that the compelling state interest test was no longer effective, he
should have replaced the test with one that better serves these competing inter-
ests. Instead, he set forth a new standard that leaves adherents of minority reli-
gions with little, if any, protection.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun suggests a fourth possible explanation for
the Court's departure from established jurisprudence: "One hopes that the
Court is aware of the consequences [of 'overturning settled law concerning the
Religious Clauses'] and that its result is not a product of overreaction to the
serious problems the country's drug crisis has generated."' 149 The idea that the
war on drugs could prompt the Court to limit constitutional freedoms is not
new.150 Some commentators suggest that a pair of 1989 decisions in which the
Court upheld mandatory drug testing,' 5 ' thereby further restricting the fourth
amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, was a result of the
pressure of the war on drugs. 152
If popular sentiment against illegal drug use influenced the Court in Smith,
then the Court may have concluded wrongly that prohibiting use of peyote by
Native Americans for religious ceremonies will favorably affect the battle. In
People v. Woody, 153 the California Supreme Court applied the compelling state
interest test to a claim that a state statute prohibiting possession and use of
peyote, and providing no exemption for the Native American Church, violated
the Native Americans' right to free exercise of religion. The California court
held that the state's interest, lying in "the deleterious effects [of peyote use] upon
the Indian community, and... in the infringement such practice would place
upon the enforcement of the narcotic laws because of the difficulty of detecting
fraudulent claims of an asserted religious use of peyote,"' 15 4 did not justify in-
fringing the Native Americans' free exercise rights. 155 In reaching its holding,
the court closely examined the nature and circumstances of the religious use of
peyote in the Native American Church.' 56 The court noted that peyote use in
the Church has a long tradition, referred to in sources dating back to 1560.157
149. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
150. See Beck, Brown & Osborne, The Cocaine War in America's Fruitbowl, AMERICAN LAW-
YER, Mar., 1990, at 82.
151. National Treasury Employee's Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (testing of drug
enforcement employees); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (testing of
railway workers).
152. See Ciolli, Boost for Drug Testing: High court upholds test for railway, customs workers,
Newsday, (Nassau and Suffolk Edition); Mar. 22, 1989, at 5.
153. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
154. Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
155. Id.
156. For a full description of religious peyote use, see id. at 720-22, 394 P.2d at 816-18, 40 Cal.
Rptr. at 72-74.
157. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
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Peyote use occurs in a controlled ceremony called a "meeting."' 58 The Native
American Church reveres peyote, and the drug's use is central to the religion.
Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to bread and
wine in certain Christian churches, it is more than a sacrament. Pe-
yote constitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers are directed to it
much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, to
use peyote for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious. Members of the
church regard peyote also as a "teacher" because it induces feelings of
brotherhood with other members; indeed, it enables members to expe-
rience the Deity. Finally, devotees treat peyote as a "protector."
Much as a Catholic carries his medallion, an Indian G.I. often wears
around his neck a beautifully beaded pouch containing one large pe-
yote button. 159
In addition to regarding the use of peyote outside of the religious ceremo-
nies as sacrilegious, the Native American Church also forbids the use of alcohol.
Anthropologists "conclude that members observe higher standards than non-
members." 16° Thus, this very limited, controlled peyote use is not drug abuse,
and limitations on its use will not advance the war on drugs.
Peyote use is not the key to the war on drugs. Between 1980 and 1987, the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized and analyzed 19.4 pounds of
peyote. This compares to the 15,302,468.7 pounds of marijuana seized and ana-
lyzed by the DEA in the same period. 161 Additionally, both the DEA and Con-
gress have recognized the right of the Native American Church to use peyote in
its religious ceremonies. The DEA exempts from its regulations the religious
use of peyote by the Native American Church.' 62 Congress also acknowledged
the religious rights of Native Americans in the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act. 163 It follows that exempting the Native American Church from the
Oregon law prohibiting peyote use would not interfere substantially with Ore-
158. Id. at 720-21, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
159. Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74.
160. Id. at 721-722 n.3, 394 P.2d at 818 n.3, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74 n.3.
161. Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1926 (1990). In Olsen, the court used these figures to distinguish between peyote and
marijuana, both Schedule I drugs, in its decision holding that an Iowa law prohibiting possession
and use of marijuana does not violate the free exercise rights of members of the Ethiopian Zion
Coptic Church, which advocates smoking marijuana "continually all day." Id. at 1463-64.
162. "The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug
use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the
Church so using peyote are exempt from registration." 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990).
The regulation also provides for the proper distribution of peyote to the church: "[a]ny person
who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to the Native American Church, however, is
required to obtain registration annually and to comply with all other requirements of law." Id.
For an analysis of the legislative history behind 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, see Frank, Accommodat-
ing Religious Drug Use and Society's War on Drugs, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1024-27 (1990).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). The Act provides:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of
the American Indian... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and freedom to worship through ceremonials.
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gon's valid interest in enforcing its drug laws and protecting its citizens from
harm.
None of the above-mentioned factors, therefore, justify rejecting the com-
pelling state interest test. While a stricter, clearer test may reduce the volume of
first amendment cases reaching the Supreme Court, judicial economy hardly
seems to justify promulgating a test that has the effect of favoring the state over
a preferred constitutional right. 164 To add to the problem, the Court offers a
weak substitute for the test it abandoned. This result leaves religious conduct
without any protection from unreasonable state laws. For example, a state
could impose a general regulation prohibiting the wearing of hats. This would
constitute a "criminal law of general applicability," and it would have the effect
of prohibiting conduct mandated by certain religions, such as Judaism. The law
would infringe on the free exercise of religion, but the religious groups offended
would have no way of challenging the state law. Because the law is criminal and
of general applicability, a court would not inquire into the state's interest in
enforcing the law. The majority's glib answer that a religious group can petition
the legislature to provide an exemption to the law for their group is insufficient.
Many minority religions cannot muster the political clout necessary to influence
the legislature. They effectively would be prohibited from free exercise of reli-
gion, even when the state has no "compelling" reason for imposing the law.
In his dissent in Smith, Justice Blackmun asserted that Oregon's interest is
"not the State's broad interest in fighting the critical 'war on drugs' ... but the
State's narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious, cere-
monial use of peyote."' 165 By narrowing the scope of Oregon's interest, he found
that Oregon did not sustain its burden of proof. According to Blackmun, Ore-
gon did not establish "any concrete interest in enforcing its drug laws against
religious users of peyote." 16 6 Specifically, the State failed to offer evidence to
support its claim that exemption of an individual would cause serious harm to
the state's interest, instead it relied on "mere speculation about the potential
harms." 167 The absence of any proof that peyote harmed anyone proved fatal to
Oregon's assertion that its interest in the protection of "the health and safety of
its citizens from the dangers of unlawful drugs" 168 justifies the regulation. In-
164. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurrence, religious freedom occupies a "pre-
ferred position" in the Constitution, and "the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty,
whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests 'of the
highest order."' Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
165. Id. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted that the state's interest
must be reduced "to the same plane of generality" to avoid "distort[ing] the weighing process in the
State's favor." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Almost any state interest can be reduced to concern
for peace, order, morals, defense, and revenue of its citizens. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 330-31 (1969)).
166. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun supported his statement by
showing that Oregon did not seek to prosecute respondents for their use of peyote and has only once
sought to enforce its law against other religious users of the drug. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The Native American Church's internal restric-
tions on, and supervision of, its members' use of peyote substantially obviate the State's health and
safety concerns." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, other states, presumably with the
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stead, this absence of proof, according to Justice Blackmun, supports a finding
that Oregon can accommodate religious users of peyote by exempting them from
Oregon's drug laws, without interfering with the state's interest in protecting the
health and welfare of its people. 169 Therefore, the state did not prove a compel-
ling state interest that justifies infringing on the respondents' important right to
the free exercise of religion. 170
In refusing to apply the compelling state interest test, the Court ignores its
own precedent. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurrence, the Court
in the past has expressly rejected the interpretation of the first amendment that
the Smith Court adopted. 171 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,172 the Court stated that "to
agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad po-
lice power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by
the... First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control,
even under regulations of general applicability."'73 The facts of Smith closely
parallel the facts of Yoder. In Yoder, the Court emphasized that the Amish
religion is an established one, having existed for almost two hundred years, com-
pared to the relatively short life (sixty years) of the compulsory school attend-
ance law. 174 Likewise, there is evidence that Peyotism has existed since the
sixteenth century, 175 hundreds of years before Oregon enacted a statute prohib-
iting peyote use. The Native American way of life, like the Amish way, is an
established one. The Court in Yoder relied heavily on the fact that the state
could not prove that education of the Amish children at home interferes with
the state's interest. 176 Similarly, Oregon would have difficulty sustaining its bur-
den of proof that accommodation of religious use of peyote by the Native Amer-
ican Church harms its "compelling interest," in light of the controlled use of the
drug by the Church, the beneficial effects of the religious ceremony on group
members, and the lack of evidence that the religious use of peyote by Native
Americans seriously has harmed the enforcement of Oregon's drug laws.
The first amendment, which guarantees the right to free exercise of religion,
was drafted against a background of religious intolerance and a desire to protect
minority beliefs against the assertion of majority opinions. 177 Many of the early
settlers came to the new world to escape religious persecution at the hands of the
majority or government-supported religion. The persecution continued in
same compelling interest in the health and welfare of its citizens, have exempted the Native Ameri-
can Church from their laws prohibiting use of peyote. Id. at 1618 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
169. Id. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1622-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserts that the Native Ameri-
cans' ritualistic use of peyote actually advances the state's interest because the church prohibits use
of peyote outside the religious ceremony and also forbids the use of alcohol. There is also some
evidence that the ceremonial use of peyote is effective in overcoming alcoholism. Id. at 1619-20
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
172. 406 U.S. 205 (1940); see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
173. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
1.74. Id. at 226-27.
175. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1964).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
177. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 411 (1963) (Douglas, ., concurring).
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America, however, where members of minority religions were harassed, jailed,
and obliged to pay taxes to support government-sponsored churches for follow-
ing the dictates of their faith. These practices "shock[ed] the freedom-loving
colonials into a feeling of abhorrence," and led to the adoption of the first
amendment. 178 The United States Supreme Court has recognized the impor-
tance of the right to free exercise of religion and has formulated a test to protect
it against governmental regulations and laws, including laws of general applica-
bility, which unjustifiably infringe on it. At the same time, this test allows the
states to enact laws for the welfare and protection of their citizens, ensuring that
conduct that is harmful to society cannot hide behind a cloak of religious free-
dom. The only requirement is that the state justify its infringement on religious
conduct by demonstrating a compelling interest that outweighs the right pro-
tected by the Constitution. Application of the test has successfully resolved
challenges of laws on free exercise grounds, protecting both the religious right
and the state's interest. Because of the success of the compelling state interest
test, and because of the deference religious freedom receives from courts, legisla-
tures, and society in general, rejection of the test is not justified by reasons of
judicial economy, "slippery slope" arguments. Neither the first amendment nor
precedent compels this rejection.
The Court in Smith held that the denial of unemployment compensation to
respondents because of their termination from work for religious use of peyote
did not violate respondents' first amendment rights to free exercise of reli-
gion. 17 9 Whatever the reason for the decision in Smith, it is clear that the Court
could have reached the same holding by applying the compelling state interest
test.180 The prohibition of respondents' religious use of peyote infringed on their
free exercise of religion. The state could have shown that its interest in protect-
ing its citizens from the dangers of drug use was compelling enough to justify the
infringement. The more likely result of applying the test, however, is that the
state's general interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens would
not have been compelling enough to justify the prohibition of controlled, sin-
cerely religious use of peyote by the Native American Church. Or the Court
might have found that exempting the Native American Church from Oregon's
drug enforcement laws, as the federal government does for its laws, would not
interfere unduly with or prevent the state from satisfying its interest.18 1 Perhaps
the fear of this conclusion prompted the Court to reject the test altogether. If so,
this fear is irrational in light of the evidence that peyote use does not have a
significant effect on the war on drugs. The Court's abandonment of the compel-
ling state interest test may have far-reaching ramifications for religious conduct,
especially for adherents to minority religions. No longer does religious conduct
enjoy protection against governmental regulations of general applicability that
effectively coerce conduct in violation of, or prohibit conduct mandated by, reli-
178. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1946).
179. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
180. Id. at 1613-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 1617-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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gious beliefs. The Court states that legislatures are free to exempt religious con-
duct from its laws. Majority religions have the power to gain legislative
attention and thus procure exemptions in their favor. It is the minority reli-
gions, such as the Native American Church, which do not have the clout to gain
legislative attention, that will suffer from the Court's decision, and minority
rights are what the Constitution is designed to protect.
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